

# Financing Projects with ICAP Revenues

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Infocast Financing U.S. Power Conference

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**LEVITAN & ASSOCIATES, INC.**

# Overview

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- ❑ Background
  - ❖ Defining the problem / goals
  - ❖ NYISO, ISO-NE, & PJM basics
  - ❖ Common and divergent objectives / approaches
- ❑ NYISO Mechanism
  - ❖ Implemented June 2003
  - ❖ Assumptions / methodology / prices
- ❑ ISO-NE Proposal
  - ❖ Resolving design issues with FERC
  - ❖ Commencing Jan '06
- ❑ PJM Proposal
  - ❖ Ambitious and more complex
  - ❖ Timing uncertain
- ❑ Future Issues

# Background

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- ❑ Problem
  - ❖ Low & volatile market capacity values
    - Capacity prices fall off “cliff” beyond minimum requirement
  - ❖ Generators in financial distress
    - Recovery of fixed plant costs through energy margin
  - ❖ Project financing model discredited
  - ❖ Long-run resource adequacy concerns
- ❑ Goals
  - ❖ Increase capacity values & reduce volatility
  - ❖ Provide price transparency to facilitate UCAP transactions
  - ❖ Recognize marginal benefit of generation above minimum level
  - ❖ Assure long-run resource adequacy

***How are the three Northeast markets – NY, NE and PJM – trying to achieve these goals?***

# Background

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- New York
  - ❖ 38,521 MW to serve 31,800 MW of load
  - ❖ Load pockets in NYC & LI
  - ❖ Significant transmission cable potential
  
- New England
  - ❖ 31,752 MW for 25,735 MW of load
  - ❖ Expected 35% reserve margin will not materialize
  - ❖ Load pockets in SWCT and NEMA/Boston
  - ❖ Heavy dependence upon gas-fired generation
  
- PJM
  - ❖ 77,730 MW to serve 65,200 MW of load (Mid Atl & APS)
  - ❖ Deliverability requirement designed to avoid locational capacity needs
  - ❖ RTO expansion west (Com Ed, AEP, & DPL) increases size 70%
  - ❖ Probable RTO expansion south (DominionVP)

# Background – Common Objectives / Approaches

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- ❑ LSEs required to satisfy ICAP requirement
  - ❖ Self-supply
  - ❖ Bilateral contracts
  - ❖ Auctions
- ❑ Provide sufficient UCAP revenues to assure cost recovery
  - ❖ Capital cost
  - ❖ Fixed operating expenses
- ❑ Avoid “cliff” problem of vertical demand curve
  - ❖ Prices rise to capped / deficiency level if market “tight”
  - ❖ Prices fall to near-zero when market is long
- ❑ Recognize locational needs
- ❑ ICAP calculated at equilibrium for “rational” investments

# Background – Divergent Objectives / Approaches

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- ❑ Timing
  - ❖ Implemented (NYISO) and proposed (ISO-NE)
  - ❖ Under development (PJM) and in discussions (Cal ISO)
- ❑ Focus
  - ❖ Near-term (NYISO, ISO-NE)
  - ❖ Medium-term (PJM)
- ❑ Net energy & ancillary service revenues
  - ❖ Included (NYISO)
  - ❖ Excluded (ISO-NE)
- ❑ Marginal value of capacity above minimum
  - ❖ Steady (NYISO)
  - ❖ Segmented (ISO-NE, PJM)
- ❑ Operability goals
  - ❖ Incorporated (PJM)
  - ❖ Availability only (NYISO, ISO-NE)

# NYISO – History

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- ❑ NY DPS introduced demand curve concept in 2002
  - ❖ Improve long-run resource adequacy by valuing additional ICAP
  - ❖ More stable and less volatile prices
- ❑ NYISO stakeholder process
  - ❖ 2003 and 2004 reference values
- ❑ FERC Approval May 2003
- ❑ Implemented June 2003
  - ❖ Replaced deficiency auction
- ❑ Three capacity auctions
  - ❖ Capability Period – six month (summer/winter) strips
  - ❖ Monthly – remaining months in period
  - ❖ Spot Market (deficiency auction) – demand curve mechanism


# NYISO – Demand Curve

- ❑ Gas Turbine Selection
  - ❖ NYC & LI – 2 x LM6000 w/ Sprint
    - 96.0 MW, 9,650 Btu/kWh
    - Substantial NYPA and LIPA data
  - ❖ ROS – 2 x 7FA
    - 336.5 MW, 10,600 Btu/kWh
    - *Limited* real-world data
  - ❖ Both gas-fired, with SCR and CO catalysts
  
- ❑ Forecast Net Revenues
  - ❖ Dispatch simulation with zones and surrounding markets
  - ❖ Summer and winter GT performance
  - ❖ Other key assumptions
    - Load forecast
    - Supply forecast
    - Fuel costs



# NYISO – GT Cash Flow Forecast

2005 Reference Plant Start Year -- New York City GT



# NYISO – Demand Curve

- ❑ Financing
  - ❖ Parent company on-balance sheet
  - ❖ Capital costs reflect *rational* merchant project
  - ❖ Debt 50% @ 7.5% 20-year
  - ❖ Equity 50% @ 12.5% (after-tax)
- ❑ Levelization
  - ❖ 12.5% discount rate (after debt service)
  - ❖ First year (nominal dollars) = reference value
  - ❖ Escalation @ 3% in future years
- ❑ Demand Curve Structure
 

	<u>Locational capacity req't</u>	<u>Zero crossing points</u>
❖ NYC	80%	118%
❖ LI	95%	118%
❖ NYCA	118%	112%

# NYISO – Demand Curve


## ❑ Derivation of 2005 Reference Values

	<u>NYC</u>	<u>LI</u>	<u>NYCA</u>	
❖ Capital Costs	\$114	\$108	\$201	millions
	\$1,189	\$1,126	\$599	/kW
❖ Lev'd Cap Rev Req't	\$176	\$155	\$ 87	/kW-yr
❖ <u>Lev'd Net Revenues</u>	<u>\$ 50</u>	<u>\$ 40</u>	<u>\$ 20</u>	/kW-yr
❖ Net ICAP Req't	\$126	\$115	\$ 67	/kW-yr
❖ Reference Points*	\$13.70	\$12.52	\$ 6.78	/kW-mo


*\*used in demand curves to meet net ICAP annual requirement*

***NYC and LI construction costs are high, and frame GTs in ROS offer significant economies of scale that lowers ICAP***


# NYISO – 2005 Capacity Rev. Requirements



# NYISO – Capacity Prices




# NYISO – NYC Auction Data



*Price convergence among auctions is a good indicator*

# NYISO – NYCA Auction Data



*Price convergence among auctions is a good indicator*

# ISO-NE


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- Generators in trouble
  - ❖ NRG – Devon, Middletown, Montville, Norwalk
  - ❖ PPL – Wallingford
  - ❖ Expected 35% reserve margin will not materialize
  
- Regulatory History
  - ❖ FERC approved SMD Sept '02
  - ❖ NRG filing for RMR Feb '03
  - ❖ Market-wide ICAP (with SMD) Mar '03
  - ❖ Apr '03 Order replaced RMR with PUSH mechanism
  - ❖ Required locational ICAP mechanism by June '04

***ISO-NE is following in NYISO's footsteps***



# ISO-NE Installed Capacity Prices



# ISO-NE

- ❑ ISO-NE Proposal Mar '04
  - ❖ Four capacity regions – ME, CT, NEMA/Bos, and Rest-of-Pool
  - ❖ June '04 implementation with 5 year phase-in period
  - ❖ Downward-sloping demand curve
  - ❖ Transition payments to peakers in constrained locations
- ❑ FERC Response June '04
  - ❖ *You win some*
    - Locational ICAP
    - Downward-sloping demand curve
  - ❖ *You lose some*
    - SWCT zone
    - Demand curve parameters
    - Delay until Jan '06 w/o transition period
    - Inter-regional capacity transfer limits (CTL)

# ISO-NE


- ❑ ISO-NE July/Aug '04 Filing
  - ❖ EBCC is a single industrial frame GT
  - ❖ Recognized SWCT zone
  - ❖ Dual-fuel capable with SCR
  - ❖ 50% debt @ 7%, 50% equity @ 12%, 20 yrs

❑ Proposed costs and demand curve parameters

	<u>NEMA</u>	<u>SWCT</u>	<u>R-CT</u>	<u>Maine</u>	<u>Rest-of-Pool</u>	
Cap Costs	\$105	\$105	\$102	\$95	\$97	million
	\$620	\$616	\$602	\$560	\$571	/kW
Lev'd Req't	\$97.87	\$99.16	\$96.52	\$87.22	\$92.34	/kW-yr
Demand curve	\$8.16	\$8.26	\$8.04	\$7.27	\$7.70	/kW-mo

***ISO-NE demand curve values may be above NYCA (\$67) value without summer / winter DMNC adjustments***

# ISO-NE – Proposed Demand Curve




# PJM – Existing System

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
- ❑ Universal deliverability implies single capacity market
- ❑ Monthly and daily capacity auctions
  - ❖ Uniform clearing price across market
  - ❖ Rigid reserve criterion creates vertical demand requirement
  - ❖ Volatile prices led to market power and RAM / RPM discussions
- ❑ New Concerns
  - ❖ Risk of insufficient unit diversity to maintain reliability
  - ❖ Increased gas-fired capacity – infrastructure concerns, price volatility
  - ❖ Declining load-following capability offered
  - ❖ Fewer units offering start/stop flexibility
  - ❖ Increasing need for 30 minute response

# PJM – Typical Winter Load



Source: PJM

# PJM – Unforced Capacity Prices




# PJM – Reliability Pricing Model

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
- ❑ Designed to promote overall system reliability
- ❑ Resource-specific to provide efficiency incentives
  - ❖ Locational demand curves
  - ❖ Product differentiated by location, type, and operational characteristics
- ❑ Deficiency charge = 2 x capacity clearing price
  - ❖ Failure to deliver
  - ❖ Increased forced outage rate
- ❑ Annual capacity auctions
  - ❖ Longer-term pricing signals to encourage bilateral contracts, investment
  - ❖ Load-following (ramp rate and start/stop) resource constraint
  - ❖ Supplemental reserves (30-minute) constraint
  - ❖ Clearing prices by optimization algorithm



# PJM – RPM Auction Timing



# PJM – Sample Demand Curve



Source: PJM

# PJM – Reference Values

- ❑ Key assumptions
  - ❖ Dual-fuel aero and frame GTs with SCR
  - ❖ 50% debt @ 7.0% 20 yr / 50% equity @ 12%
  - ❖ Fixed O&M costs included

- ❑ Costs and demand curve parameters

	<u>2xLM6000</u>		<u>2x7FA</u>
Cap Costs	\$79.6	\$156.5	million (2004)
	\$817	\$447	/kW
Lev'd Req't	\$125.71	\$66.64	/kW-yr (2006)
Dem Curve	\$344.40	\$182.58	/MW-day

***Proposed PJM demand curve values are remarkably close to NYISO values***

# Future ICAP Issues

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- ❑ NYISO
  - ❖ LIPA contracts (KeySpan, etc) makes market “thin”
  - ❖ Neptune cable project would affect LI locational ICAP / supply
  - ❖ NYC challenges – SCS Astoria PPA, NYPA RFP
- ❑ ISO-NE
  - ❖ CTL values will affect LBMPs
  - ❖ Transmission projects in SWCT and NEMA/Boston
- ❑ PJM
  - ❖ RPM is ambitious and different than NYISO / ISO-NE
  - ❖ RPM addresses unidentified load pockets
  - ❖ Timing and final design uncertain

***True test of ICAP mechanism will be the “right” generator entry  
in the desired locations***